HOLD THE MAYO: WHY STRONG DEFERENCE TO
TREASURY REGULATIONS MIGHT NOT BE HEALTHY
GRANT MARSHALL*
I.

INTRODUCTION

“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”1 However, in some respects, the judicial department has
surrendered its interpretive powers to agencies tasked with interpreting
Congressional statutes.2 Courts have long deferred to governmental agency and
department rules and regulations.3 In the landmark case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court promulgated the current
standard for court deference.4 Until recently, courts have given IRS treasury
regulations less deference than the regulations of other governmental agencies.5
However, since the recent Supreme Court case Mayo Foundation for Medical Education
& Research v. United States, courts must now use the more deferential Chevron
standard.6 But is a heightened level of deference to the IRS sound public policy?
Part II of this article discusses Chevron and Mayo and the multiple deference standards
set forth by the Supreme Court. Part III provides an overview of biases and
heuristics in individuals, firms, and governmental agencies, as well as how these
biases and heuristics affect the IRS in the drafting of regulations. Part IV discusses
the policy implications behind these findings. Part V concludes.

* J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law.
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Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

2

See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (2006).

3

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).

4

Id. at 843-44.

5

See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712-13 (2011).

6

Id. at 713-14.
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CHEVRON DEFERENCE AND MAYO

The Chevron holding sets forth the current standard of deference courts must
give to governmental agencies. The Chevron Court’s analysis begins as follows:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. . . . [I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.7
An agency’s interpretation of a statute is given controlling weight unless it is
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”8 A court may not
substitute its own construction of a statute if the agency’s interpretation is a
reasonable one.9 The Court further stated that “considerable weight” should be
given to agencies in these circumstances.10
As an example, the Court in Mayo applied the Chevron standard to determine
whether certain treasury regulations were valid.11 The issue in Mayo was “whether
doctors who serve as medical residents are properly viewed as ‘student[s]’ whose
service Congress has exempted from [Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)]
taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10).”12 Inundated with claims, the Treasury
Department had adopted a rule stating that an employee’s service is “incident” to his
studies only if the educational aspect between the employee and employer is
predominant to the service aspect.13 The treasury regulation categorically states that
a full time employee—one normally scheduled to work forty hours or more per
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The Court further noted that the reading court need not agree with the
agency’s reading of the statute; it must only find the construction permissible. See id. at 843 n.11.
7

Id. at 844; see also United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453
U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United
States, 299 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1936).

8

9

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.

10

See id.

11

See Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 711.

12

Id. at 708 (first alteration in original).

13

Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(i).
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week—is not providing services incident to his or her course of study.14 First, the
Mayo Court applied Chevron step one, asking whether Congress directly addressed the
definition of a “student” under FICA or whether the statute applies to medical
residents.15 The Court found no indication that Congress intended to include
medical residents in FICA, so the Court continued to Chevron step two,16 asking
whether the rule is “‘arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to
the statute.’”17 The Court found that the regulation easily satisfied Chevron step two
because the Treasury Department’s rule was a “‘reasonable interpretation’” of
FICA.18
However, the standard of deference given to the IRS has not always been so
clear. Justice Roberts noted in his majority opinion in Mayo that, since the Supreme
Court decided Chevron in 1984, it has cited both National Muffler and Chevron regarding
IRS regulations.20 The National Muffler standard of deference, articulated in a 1979
decision, states:
19

In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the
congressional mandate in a proper manner, we look to see whether
the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its
See Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(iii); see also Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(e) (Example 4)
(stating that, because an employee’s “normal work schedule” calls for the employee to work more
than 40 hours per week, the employee’s services are “not incident to and for the purpose of pursuing
a course of study”).
14

15

See Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 711.

16

See id.

17

Id. (quoting Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004)).

See id. at 714-15 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984)). The Court found that “[f]ocusing on the hours an individual works and the hours he spends
in studies is a perfectly sensible way of accomplishing that goal.” Id. at 715.

18

See Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations: A Reconsideration in Light of National Cable,
Swallows Holding, and Other Developments, 61 TAX LAW. 481, 490-91 (2008) (describing the multiple
standards of deference courts use while ruling on Treasury Department regulations).
19

Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712 (“Since deciding Chevron, [the Court has] cited both National Muffler and
Chevron in [its] review of Treasury Department regulations.”) (citing United States v. Cleveland Indians
Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001) (citing National Muffler); Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 523 U.S.
382, 387, 389 (1998) (citing Chevron and Cottage Savings); Cottage Savs. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554,
560-61 (1991) (citing National Muffler); United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4 (1985) (citing
Chevron)).
20
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origin, and its purpose. A regulation may have particular force if it is
a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those
presumed to have been aware of congressional intent. If the
regulation dates from a later period, the manner in which it evolved
merits inquiry. Other relevant considerations are the length of time
the regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the
consistency of the Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of
scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent
re-enactments of the statute.21
The Court further stated that “[t]he choice among reasonable interpretations is for
the Commissioner, not the courts”22 and that the regulation “merits serious
deference.”23
After Chevron, the Supreme Court again, in 2001, added further confusion to
the standard of deference debate in United States v. Mead Corp., where the Court
allowed a high standard of deference when Congress had not addressed the exact
issue.24 The Court also renewed the test from Skidmore v. Swift & Co.—a standard
that examines factors such as “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency,
formality, and relative expertness, and . . . the persuasiveness of the agency’s
position.”25 Skidmore, unlike Chevron, allows the reviewing court to choose a different
rule even if the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.26
Prior to Mayo, different courts gave IRS regulations different standards of
deference, including the Chevron standard,27 the National Muffler standard,28 the
21

Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).

22

Id. at 488.

23

Id. at 484.

See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Irving Salem et al., ABA Section of Taxation
Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 720 (2004) [hereinafter ABA Task Force
Report].

24

Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)) (citations
omitted).
25

26

ABA Task Force Report, supra note 24, at 720.

27

See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.

28

See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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reasonableness test—a standard where courts simply take the totality of factors and
ask whether a certain Treasury Regulation is a reasonable reading of the statute,29 and
the Skidmore standard.30 To add to the confusion, these standards have different
meanings in different situations.31
In Mayo, the main issue was which standard of deference the Supreme Court
should apply.32 The district court in Mayo rejected the Treasury Regulation, citing the
National Muffler standard.33 The Court implied that the Chevron standard is much
more deferential than that of National Muffler, noting that “a court might view an
agency’s interpretation of a statute with heightened skepticism when it has not been
consistent over time, when it was promulgated years after the relevant statute was
enacted, or because of the way in which the regulation evolved.”34 The Court further
reasoned that it should not “carve out” a deferential standard that is only applicable
to tax law; instead, judicial review of administration actions should be uniform.35
The Court held that the principles underlying Chevron apply to Mayo, recognizing that
“‘[t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . .
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill
any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress’”36 and that filling gaps left by
Congress necessarily requires the Treasury Department to interpret complex Internal
Revenue Code statutes.37

See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 24, at 740. The reasonableness test is very similar to the
National Muffler standard, which is used to determine whether a regulation is reasonable. Id.

29

30

Berg, supra note 19, at 490.

31

Id.

See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711-14 (2011)
(discussing whether National Muffler or Chevron deference applies to the Treasury Regulation at issue).

32

33

Id. at 712.

34

Id. (citing Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)).

35

Id. at 713.

Id. (alteration and ellipsis in original) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).

36

Id.; see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983) (noting that, with the
complexity of the tax system, the IRS should be able to “exercise its authority to meet changing
conditions and new problems”).

37
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Why do courts defer to agencies? The primary reason for deference is the
fact that Congress generally gives authority to the Treasury Department to “prescribe
all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code],
including all rules and regulations as may be necessary.”38 However, the Code does
not establish the level of deference a court must give to the Treasury Department.
One principle of administrative law is that “[a]dministrative efficiency is
increased by . . . specialization.”39 Furthermore, administrative law is focused on
“getting things done.”40 Judicial deference accomplishes this goal because Treasury
Regulations are inherently quicker and easier to enact and apply without constant
interruption from the judiciary. Without deference, regulations would always be
pending in the courts and things would not “get done” as quickly or efficiently.
Furthermore, “[s]cholarship about judicial review of agency regulation, like
administrative law scholarship generally, has proceeded by assuming, either implicitly
or explicitly, that the agency and its staff act rationally.”41 Judge Posner himself has
championed the rationality of individuals.42 After all, administrative law generally
ignores what happens inside an agency.43 Scholars generally treat agencies as rational
decisionmakers.44 Perhaps because administrative law views agencies as rational
decisionmakers, courts must defer to their regulations. This may be problematic
because rationality may be applied to both individuals and organizations.45 Yet, the
misconception that human beings are always rational, which has permeated utilitarian
38

I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2011).

HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 20 (1976).
39

40

Id. at 1.

Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 486, 489 (2002).

41

Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption
from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1061 (2000) (“[A]s Richard Posner has written, ‘man is a
rational maximizer of his ends.’”) (quoting Richard A. Posner, Are We One Self or Multiple Selves?:
Implications for Law and Public Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23, 24 (1997)).
42

Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 487. Seidenfeld compares administrative treatment of agencies to a
black box. Id. (citing RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS (3d ed.
1999)).
43

44

Id. at 488. Seidenfeld notes two exceptions: groupthink and boundedly rational decisionmaking. Id.

45

See SIMON, supra note 39, at 76-77.
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political philosophy, has long been “decisively refuted by modern developments in
psychology and sociology.”46 In fact, “[i]t is impossible for the behavior of a single,
isolated individual to reach any high degree of rationality.”47 However, when an
organization brings together individuals and trains and informs those individuals,
they begin to near objective rationality.48
III. BIASES AND HEURISTICS
Individuals do not always act as economists assume—that is, to maximize
utility by weighing the costs and benefits of a particular choice.49 In reality,
decisionmakers make cognitive errors that can lead to often predictable biases.50 As
first noted by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, individuals are susceptible to
biases stemming from judgmental heuristics.51 When faced with complicated
decisions or judgments, people often rely on heuristics, or “general rules of thumb,”
to reduce the amount of time and effort necessary to make reasonably good
decisions.52 While these heuristics generally lead to fairly good estimates, they may
also lead to systematic biases.53 “[E]veryone is exposed”54—reliance on heuristics is
not only limited to laymen.55 Furthermore, “individual judgment and choice is often
driven by heuristic-based reasoning as opposed to the pure optimization approach

46

Id. at 61-62.

47

Id. at 79.

48

Id. at 80.

49

Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 491.

50

Id. at 492.

Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE
1124, 1130 (1974). For a general discussion on heuristics, see also SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION M AKING 107, 109 (1993).
51

52

PLOUS, supra note 51, at 109.

53

Id.; see also Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 494-95.

54

Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 51, at 1130.

Id. On the other hand, “the statistically sophisticated avoid elementary errors, such as the gambler’s
fallacy.” Id. However, these experts nevertheless “are liable to similar fallacies in more intricate and
less transparent problems.” Id.

55
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presumed by rational choice theory.”56 In theory, an individual would make a costbenefit analysis and choose the option that would maximize utility.57 “In reality,
individuals more often rely on simpler, heuristic reasoning to make both judgments
about the world and decisions of how to act within that world. Difficult questions . .
. are dealt with by substituting answers to easier questions, . . . and difficult decisions
. . . are resolved by making easier choices.”58 It should be noted that although these
heuristics may lead to irrational, non-profit maximizing choices, they are necessary
because, if all of our “decisions were made only after constructing a regression model
containing all relevant data, none of us could complete the myriad cognitive
processing tasks we face each day.”59
One automatically and intuitively uses heuristics to make judgments quicker
and with less effort.60 This is because “[i]ndividuals generally have neither the time
to collect and analyze such information nor the capability of performing all the
necessary comparisons that optimization entails.”61 This way of simplifying a
cognitive task, known as “satisficing,” involves an individual looking for alternatives
until reaching “a preset level of satisfaction.”62 However, heuristics, while essential
to decision-making, can cause an individual to make choices irrationally by

Russell Korobkin, The Problems with Heuristics for Law 1 (UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ.
Research
Paper
Series,
Research
Paper
No.
04-1,
2004),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=496462. Rational choice theory assumes that
individuals will process information and make choices that will maximize utility—i.e. to “maximize
the differential between expected benefits and expected costs.” Id. at 2.
56

57

Id. at 2-3.

58

Id. at 3.

59

Id.

60 Id. at 14 (citing Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49
(Gilovich et al. eds., 2002)). For example, Korobkin relates heuristics with the classic anecdote where
“a drunk look[s] for his lost keys under a lamp post because that is where the light is best.” Id.
61

Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 492; cf. Korobkin, supra note 56, at 3.

Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 492. See generally Jonathan Brodie Bendor et al., Satisficing: A ‘Pretty
Good’ Heuristic, 9 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON., Iss. 1, Art. 9 (2009) (proposing a mathematical model
of satisficing).
62
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prompting the individual to overvalue or undervalue information related to that
choice.63
In addition to citizens, lawmakers and policymakers show reliance on
heuristics.64 A problem arises “when lawmakers attempt to make decisions for the
collective that maximize social utility . . . because the decisions of lawmakers might
not be optimal given available information.”65 Regulators who rely on heuristics tend
to misestimate or ignore costs and benefits when reaching decisions, resulting in
regulators failing to create optimal incentives.66
Furthermore, regulators may engage in groupthink, “‘a mode of thinking that
people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the
members’ striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise
alternative courses of action.’”67 One particularly relevant antecedent condition is
negative decision framing.68 For example, consider a firm that made $10 million last
year but will only make $1 million this year.69 According to prospect theory, the firm
and its employees may perceive this as a loss of $9 million.70 The IRS may be
affected by prospect theory in a similar respect. If the revenue from the IRS was $28
billion in 2011, but the IRS estimated future revenue at only $25 billion, it might see
the difference as a loss of $3 billion and regulate accordingly to increase revenue.
Concurrence seeking is another groupthink heuristic that might cause problems in
the IRS.71 The danger in concurrence seeking “is not that people will be reluctant to
disagree with the majority because they are motivated to preserve group unity, but
63

See Korobkin, supra note 56, at 3.

64

Id. at 4.

65

Id.

66

See id. at 9-10.

Glen Whyte, Recasting Janis’s Groupthink Model: The Key Role of Collective Efficacy in Decision Fiascoes, 73
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 185, 185-86 (1998) (quoting IRVING
LESTER JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 9
(Houghton Mifflin 1982)).
67

68

Id. at 193.

69

Id.

Id. (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979)).

70

71

See id. at 196.

352

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 13

that people will be reluctant to challenge the policy favored by the majority or the
leader because they believe the policy to be a good one.”72
Decision making can also be sidetracked by both interest group biases73 and
cognitive biases.74 Professors Eskridge, Jr. and Ferejohn provide an excellent
summary of the cognitive biases associated with groups of individuals.75 Explaining
one potential mental mistake of groups, “[a] committee might overgeneralize from
dramatic and emotionally striking events (the availability heuristic) or from small
unrepresentative samples (the representativeness heuristic).”76 For example, a person
might “assess the risk of heart attack among middle-aged people by recalling such
occurrences among one’s acquaintances.”77 While availability is useful for
determining probability or frequency, it is also affected by factors other than
probability or frequency.78 Another concern is that “[a] committee might anchor its
decisionmaking on an arbitrary starting point and filter factual evidence through the
lens of that bias (anchoring or cognitive dissonance).”79 For example, experts
severely underestimate the time it takes for a novice to complete a task because the
experts more easily recall their experiences as experts, where completing the task

72

Id.

See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical
View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 616 (2002) (“[S]elfish interest groups and public officials highjack the
governmental process for their private gain, thereby undermining the public interest in efficient rules
and distributions.”).
73

Id. at 621 (“For example, a committee tackling the issue of global warming can reach disastrously
wrong conclusions not just by pandering to the interests of industrial polluters (the public choice
problem), but also by making simple but predictable mistakes in reasoning (the cognitive psychology
problem).”).
74

75

See generally id. at 621-23 (summarizing different cognitive biases).

Id. at 621 (citations omitted); accord Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by
Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 84-85 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (noting that people tend to expect sample sizes “to be highly
representative of their parent populations”).
76

77

Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 51, at 1127.

78

Id.

79

Eskridge, Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 73, at 622.
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took less time.80 Expertise can actually increase the underestimation bias and can
become more resistant to debiasing.81 Another common heuristic largely connected
with groups or associations is that they “might impute [their] members’ own views
and preferences to everyone else, an assumption that reflects lack of empathy or
understanding of others’ different situations (the egocentrism bias).”82 For example,
experts might be unable to see another’s perspective, thus attributing to others the
expert’s own knowledge or viewpoint.83
Another common committee heuristic is that they might “tend to defer to
experts (the expert-deference bias, also hypervigilance) who themselves tend to be
overconfident about their conclusions (the overconfidence bias).”84 That is, even if
the committee itself is not comprised of experts who exhibit the bias, the committee
will defer to those who tend to exhibit the overconfidence bias.85 A committee
problem that may be especially problematic with the IRS is that:
[i]f the committee is composed of like-thinking persons, deliberation
might tend to skew the committee’s conclusions toward positions
more extreme than those with which the members started (the
polarization effect). . . . [T]here is a danger that committee members
will go along with a proposal only because they think ‘everyone
thinks this way’ (the cascade effect).86
For example, when like-minded individuals “meet regularly, without sustained
exposure to competing views[,] extreme movements are all the more likely,”87 often

See Pamela J. Hinds, The Curse of Expertise: The Effects of Expertise and Debiasing Methods on Predictions of
Novice Performance, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: APPLIED 205, 217 (1999).

80

81

Id.

82

Eskridge, Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 73, at 622.

Raymond S. Nickerson, How We Know—and Sometimes Misjudge—What Others Know: Imputing One’s
Own Knowledge to Others, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 737, 738 (1999).
83

84

Eskridge, Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 73, at 622 (citations omitted).

85

See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.

Eskridge, Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 73, at 622; accord Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why
Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74 (2000).

86

87

Sunstein, supra note 86, at 75.
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resulting in riskier choices.88 Finally, “[i]f the problem is complex, the committee
may be overwhelmed and paralyzed (information overload) or driven away from
correct but extreme positions (the dilution effect) by considering too much
information, and may consequently be unduly deferential to other decisionmakers.”89
An important question remains: whether individuals are more prone to biases
than firms and governmental agencies. Judge Cardozo recognized the problem of
bias by judges and sought to acknowledge these biases that often rule decision
making.90 Most cognitive bias literature focuses on individual decisional biases.91
While individual biases are important, the individual biases that most influence
decision making may have less of an effect on group decision making.92 “Although
expertise and the group nature of agency decisionmaking can alleviate many such
biases, it can also amplify some biases.”93
The IRS is a super-technical, legal entity. Thus, are its lawyers subjected to
motivated reasoning, biases, and heuristics? Although the IRS is an agency and,
compared to individuals, is generally less affected by biases and heuristics,94 those
writing the regulations have predominately similar backgrounds as tax lawyers.95
While some groups, firms, or agencies might employ individuals from all disciplines
and backgrounds, the IRS Chief Counsel is generally comprised of like-minded
lawyers, possibly minimizing the effect that the group has on reducing bias among
the individual attorneys. Decision making reflects the professional education of
DONALD G. ELLIS & B. AUBREY FISHER, SMALL GROUP DECISION MAKING: COMMUNICATION
AND THE GROUP PROCESS 42 (1974).

88

Eskridge, Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 73, at 622-23 (citations omitted); see also Philip E. Tetlock &
Richard Boettger, Accountability: A Social Magnifier of the Dilution Effect, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 388, 396 (1989) (an empirical analysis on the dilution effect).
89

Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth
Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 152 (2008).
90

91

Eskridge, Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 73, at 620.

92

Id. at 620-21.

93

Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 492.

94

See id. at 492-93.

See John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations and Revenue
Rulings after Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 65 (2003) (discussing the procedure by which IRS attorneys
draft regulations).
95
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individuals,96 and lawyers are trained to serve the best interests of their clients, often
regardless of what other individuals might think.97 In Revenue Procedure 64-22, the
IRS provides general guidance for its staff:
At the heart of administration is interpretation of the Code. It is the
responsibility of each person in the Service, charged with the duty of
interpreting the law, to try to find the true meaning of the statutory
provision and not to adopt a strained construction in the belief that
he is “protecting the revenue.” The revenue is properly protected
only when we ascertain and apply the true meaning of the statute.98
Revenue Procedure 64-22 indicates that the IRS’s primary function is to ensure the
efficient operation of the tax system; that function is best served in a fair and
balanced manner that focuses on self-assessment.99
Because the IRS is comprised of experts, it is important to note which biases
expertise is likely to exacerbate. One such bias is the egocentrism bias.100
Egocentrism is “an inability to take another’s perspective, which is tantamount to
assuming that another’s perspective is precisely one’s own.”101 This bias occurs
because individuals tend to attribute their own knowledge to others.102
Congress knows that the IRS is affected by biases and heuristics, but, as
Justice Scalia notes, “Congress . . . knows that the ambiguities it creates . . . will be
resolved, within the bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a
particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known.”103 Justice Scalia
brings up an interesting point: Congress knows the biases of the IRS and can plan
96

See Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 493.

JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 61
(1989).

97

98

Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689.

Richard Lavoie, Analyzing the Schizoid Agency: Achieving the Proper Balance in Enforcing the Internal Revenue
Code, 23 AKRON TAX J. 1, 9 (2008).

99

100

Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 496; see also supra note 82 and accompanying text.

101

Nickerson, supra note 83, at 738.

102

Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 496 (citing Nickerson, supra note 83, at 738).
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accordingly. However, Congress cannot know the possible biases of a particular
judge that might hear a case relating to ambiguity in a code section,104 and
consequently it cannot prepare accordingly.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Regulatory and budgetary decisions made by the Treasury Department
function as collective choices on behalf of the citizens of the country. Traditional
theory supports the argument that these choices should be made based on a
comparison between the costs and benefits of these respective choices to society as a
whole or to a particular group.105 Because heuristics can lead to biasing Treasury
Regulations, the IRS might fail to provide for ultimately optimal choices or
incentives.106 Therefore, public policy would benefit from debiasing mechanisms
that decrease the IRS’s reliance on heuristics, enabling increased analysis by the use
of cost and benefit calculations.
A. Less Deference
Clearly an unbiased regulatory agency makes decisions that maximize utility
more so than one affected by biases and heuristics.107 Since individuals act on biases
and heuristics, should courts defer to IRS regulations? One policy approach
designed to combat biases and heuristics affecting Treasury Regulations would be to
give less deference to them. The benefits are twofold. First, giving less deference to
the IRS would incentivize the IRS to self-regulate or self-debias, because it would
likely be under much more scrutiny. Secondly, if courts give less deference to the
Treasury Department’s regulations, the court system will then have more
opportunity to cleanse from the body of law biased regulations drafted by Treasury
Department agents who are affected by heuristics and motivated reasoning. On the
other hand, judges would also have more leeway to interpret Congress’ tax code
however they see fit, and, as Judge Cardozo pointed out, judges are influenced by

The IRS cannot predict which code sections will be litigated against, nor which judge years from
then might hear the particular case.
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biases too.108 Judicial reasoning can also produce suboptimal results because of
heuristics.109
The drawback with less deference given to agencies is fairly obvious. The
IRS regulates the Internal Revenue Code—a highly technical subject matter—and
the IRS hires highly specialized attorneys to draft these regulations. It seems logical
that courts should defer to such expertise and training because, while individual
members of the IRS might be more biased by political pressures or revenue creation,
as a whole the IRS is in a position to curb heuristics and perform extraordinarily indepth cost-benefit analyses that judges practically cannot. If courts do not defer to
the IRS, judges must interpret the Internal Revenue Code. A judge would then be
faced with a very difficult task and might be bounded rationally by using heuristics to
find a quick solution.
B. Debiasing Mechanisms
There are readily known fixes for heuristic biases. For example, suppose an
individual overestimates the frequency of an occurrence because that event is salient
and easily comes to mind.110 One solution is to keep track of the events and research
the number of occurrences.111 Keeping statistics can reduce the impact of biases and
heuristics because one relies less on beliefs and more on actual, confirmed data.112
Furthermore, one can structure the decision making process “to alleviate entire
typologies of errors . . . reduc[ing] bias without creating new biases.”113
Currently, the IRS has little incentive to constrain its biases because the
courts have awarded it a high standard of deference. As long as the IRS’s
construction of a statute is “permissible,” courts must defer.114 Thus, sound public
See supra note 90 and accompanying text; see also Korobkin, supra note 56, at 11 (“[J]udges, like lay
people, often rely on heuristic reasoning rather than deductive logic when reaching probability
judgments.”); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 51, at 1130 (noting that even experts are influenced by
heuristics).
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policy supports incorporating some kind of debiasing mechanism to quell biased
regulations. One such debiasing mechanism could be for Congress to “require
regulators to conduct an explicit cost-benefit analysis of proposals and authorize
judicial review of agency actions to insure that they are based on rational
deliberation.”115 Because heuristic biases are predictable, there are often decision
making techniques that can help to avoid biased judgments.116 However, Eskridge,
Jr. and Ferejohn question the predictability and simplicity of biases because
“cognitive biases have grown like weeds in a vacant lot” and have multiplied, making
it “harder to reach conclusions from them.”117 Furthermore, they question the “basis
for understanding how the different biases interact with one another.”118
In studies on prediction, the accuracy of actuarial predictions, which are
based on empirical relations between variables and an outcome, is equal to or better
than clinical predictions, which are based on the judgment of humans.119 Predictions
are more accurate when humans do not make the decisions even if the human has
full access to actuarial information.120 Thus, agencies of the IRS could employ
computers as a debiasing mechanism in this regard. Instead of relying on the beliefs
of agents, the IRS could pursue more effective and unbiased means of
information—not just predictions.
As Professor Kunda noted, the IRS could implement debiasing mechanisms
such as using motivated reasoning.121 There are two types of motivated reasoning:
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those motivated to reach an accurate result and those motivated to reach a
“particular, directional conclusion.”122 Research on accuracy-driven reasoning, one
motivated reasoning device, suggests that people who are motivated to be accurate
work harder to reach that result.123 Evidence suggests that “manipulations designed
to increase accuracy motives lead to an elimination or reduction of cognitive
biases.”124 Therefore, if individuals “expected to justify their judgments, expected
their judgments to be made public, or expected their evaluations to affect [a]
person’s life,” then those individuals are less prone to engage in heuristic and biased
probability judgments.125 Furthermore, accuracy-motivated persons tend to make
decisions or judgments that are less extreme or risky.126 All else being equal, persons
motivated to be accurate are generally more accurate than others.127 The IRS should
take advantage of motivated reasoning when interpreting statutes to make
regulations as close to the meaning and as fair to the statute as possible. For
example, if a drafter of a regulation must explain the theory behind the regulation
and its purpose to other members of the IRS and to outsiders who wish to know
about the new regulation, under Kunda’s theory, that drafter would be more
motivated to reach an accurate, fair result than if the person simply had to write a
piece of regulation.128
On the other hand, perhaps the IRS itself creates an atmosphere
incentivizing accuracy related motivated-reasoning. While the current state of the
law creates a disincentive for the IRS to debias, the state of the actual work
environment creates significant incentives for IRS lawyers to debias themselves
because there is a necessity to be accurate.129 The IRS might have an incentive to
implement self-debiasing mechanisms because some employees in the IRS may wish
to pursue a career at a private firm after their time at the IRS. When the IRS
publishes one-sided regulations, those outside the IRS will perceive that the IRS
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interprets statutes in a biased manner,130 negatively affecting future job prospects for
IRS attorneys. Who wants to hire someone who is known to practice with biases
and heuristics? Therefore, the agents themselves will be accuracy-driven in
regulations as opposed to being motivated toward arriving at a “pro-IRS” result.
Additionally, if the IRS carries a stigma of employing biased agents and firms no
longer hire lawyers with IRS experience as often as before, the IRS may have a
difficult time finding skilled lawyers to work there in the first place.131 Thus, IRS
officials higher up in the chain of command will be better served by ensuring that
regulations remain accurate and not biased, thereby incentivizing accuracy
motivation.
V.

CONCLUSION

With Mayo and the Chevron standard in full force, will the IRS become bolder
in its interpretation of Treasury Regulations? This question is difficult to answer
because “there is no objective metric for measuring how good a rule is.”132 Adding
to the existing problems, in recent years, the IRS has attempted to increase its
enforcement efforts aimed at abusive tax shelters; however, these efforts may end up
affecting honest taxpayers instead of the intended targets.133 Taxpayers should be
concerned that the IRS will “adopt one-sided interpretations of the law favoring the
government.”134 Maybe the IRS is the ideal agency, is completely rational, and does
not give in to heuristics. However, as research shows, this is highly unlikely. Courts
should be aware of biases and heuristics that accompany agency regulation and act as
the proper check to its biases. While strong deference to the IRS might be effective
in the short-run, the IRS may develop less incentive to check its own biases in the
long-run without another branch of the U.S. Government—namely the Judiciary—
acting as a check to its now vast regulatory powers.
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